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On 22 June the so called Five Presidents’ report, authored by Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk,
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi, and Martin Schulz, was published, outlining plans for
strengthening economic and monetary union. Iain Begg assesses what the report means for the
future of the euro. He ﬁnds that while some of the proposals are well-judged and combine ambition
with realism, others are too vague, and that there are still areas, such as the future role of the ECB,
that deserve attention. He also notes the risk that some EU countries may lack an appetite for
further governance changes and that the proposals may be challenging for the UK.
Since the Greek crisis ﬁrst erupted in the autumn of 2009 – yes, it is that long ago – the EU has put in place a range
of new governance mechanisms designed to make economic and monetary union (EMU) more eﬀective and
resilient. Yet, by common consent, there is more to be done. The latest proposals come in the form of what is being
called the Five Presidents’ report, made public on the 22nd of June 2015.
It contains updated plans for ‘Completing Europe’s economic and monetary union’ in three stages by 2025, with the
aim of dealing with many of the ﬂaws exposed by the crisis in the original design of EMU, and follows the Four
Presidents’ report on achieving ‘Genuine economic and monetary union’ published in 2012. The four Presidents
were those of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup, the
last being the body which brings together the ﬁnance ministers of Eurozone countries. This time Martin Schulz,
President of the European Parliament, has muscled his way on to the cover page as the ﬁfth.
While such plans are, on the whole, welcomed by the
UK, keen to see a restoration of stability across the
Channel, they are also a source of some anxiety. One
of the lower proﬁle themes on the UK’s renegotiation
agenda is to make sure that new deals agreed by the
Eurozone do not place the country at a disadvantage.
It may lack the visibility of the debates around
immigration and beneﬁts, but could potentially be
more disruptive and maybe even threatening to UK
interests. In particular, the prospect of ﬁnancial
regulations inimical to the City of London has been a
persistent concern.
The 2012 Four Presidents’ report proposed closer
integration in four main areas. These were: banking
union; closer integration of budgetary policies,
including a possible additional budgetary capacity at
Eurozone level and a common debt instrument (a
limited form of Eurobond called Eurobills); better
coordination of economic policies other than ﬁscal
policy; and a strengthening of democratic legitimation and accountability – potentially bringing about at least a
degree of political union.
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In the end, only the banking union dimension made much progress, ﬁrst through the agreement of a new structure
for prudential supervision of banks (the single supervisory mechanism, with the European Central Bank at the
pinnacle of a network of national supervisors), and a common approach to resolving failing banks (the single
resolution mechanism). Some of the Member States outside the Eurozone voluntarily agreed to participate in these
initiatives, although it will be no surprise to readers that the UK was not among them.
The same broad headings remain in the new report, but some of the more contentious components have been
dropped or toned-down in scope. There is no longer any mention of new ﬁscal capacities nor of debt mutualisation.
Instead there is a more vague call to create a ‘ﬁscal stabilisation function’, the details of which will be worked out by
an expert group to be set up in due course. Principles for ﬁscal stabilisation include avoiding a system that will result
in permanent cross-border transfers – plainly intended to allay the concerns of the creditor countries – as well as
ensuring compliance with ﬁscal rules and the common EU (NB: not just Eurozone) Fiscal framework. The discussion
also makes clear that any new arrangements are not to be used for crisis management.
Two of the more eye-catching new proposals are intended to complete banking union. The ﬁrst is to establish a
common deposit insurance scheme to complement the protections oﬀered to depositors by national agencies. This
was one of the original ideas for banking union which failed to garner enough support after 2012, for the basic
political economy reason that creditor countries saw it as potentially an open-ended commitment to bail out debtor
countries – in other words a moral hazard risk. The new proposal suggests making the common scheme a form of
reinsurance for national deposit insurance, providing top-down funding when the national scheme is in trouble,
rather than an all-encompassing supranational one. It will be based on contributions from the banking sector, rather
than public money, and is a sensible compromise solution that should make it easier to accept.
The second development will be what is called a ‘bridge ﬁnancing mechanism’ as a backstop to the single resolution
fund already agreed at the end of 2013. Critics had complained that the fund in question risked being too small and
too slow to build up to its target size (it was to take ten years and thus not to be fully operational until 2025). There is
a clear logic to making money available rapidly given the continuing precarity of many European banks.
If both these proposals make headway, the result would be a more integrated and resilient Eurozone banking
system and would go a long way towards breaking the ‘doom-loop’ in which problems in the banking system cause
problems for public ﬁnances (think of Ireland, Spain and Cyprus), or problems in public ﬁnances cause banking
fragility (Greece). But agreement will be hard to reach for the same reasons as before, namely that creditor
countries will fear that they will be put at risk, even though the plan is, ultimately, to raise money from the ﬁnancial
sector rather than tax-payers. Restoration of ‘normal’ bank lending is, nevertheless, vital to restore economic growth
and to reduce the dangerously high levels of unemployment in many Member States.
The report also emphasises the importance of the Capital Markets Union which is at the top of the agenda of UK
European Commissioner, Lord Hill. In other currency areas, such as the US dollar, private ﬁnancial ﬂows mitigate
many of the consequences of an asymmetric shock aﬀecting only certain regions, but cross-border ﬂows of this sort
have been more limited in the Eurozone, inhibiting an important adjustment mechanism. It is not a magic bullet, but
a deepening of European capital markets should, in time, complement other mechanisms.
On ﬁscal policy, the Five Presidents are more circumspect than was the case in 2012. They reiterate the importance
of ﬁscal discipline – referring to ‘responsible budgetary policies’. Apart from the suggested new approach to ﬁscal
stabilisation, they call for the creation of a European Fiscal Board to act as an independent check on the conduct of
ﬁscal policy. Many countries have already set up their own ﬁscal councils (the UK’s equivalent is the Oﬃce for
Budget Responsibility – OBR), but they diﬀer in their scope and inﬂuence. The OBR, for example, was given
responsibility for oﬃcial forecasts as well as examining the government’s ﬁscal plans, whereas (as an illustration)
the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council is asked only to assess the government’s forecasts and budgetary plans.
The Five Presidents’ advocacy of this new Board is justiﬁed by the claim that it would ‘lead to better compliance with
the common ﬁscal rules’ and would result in ‘stronger coordination of national ﬁscal policies’. It stops short, however,
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of saying that it would facilitate the setting of a common Eurozone ﬁscal stance, the absence of which is something
that many critics of euro governance have bemoaned. Indeed, many leading economists have argued that a
collective ﬁscal stimulus is precisely what the Eurozone needs today to boost economic growth, but that it cannot be
achieved while decisions on ﬁscal positions are left to national authorities. A consequent danger is that the Five
Presidents’ ideas will be seen (fairly or not, but it is often perceptions that matter as much as intent) as oﬀering no
way out of the prevailing austerity narrative.
There is also a hint that the new ﬁscal board should contribute to ‘informed public debate’. This would be welcome,
but the new board will need to demonstrate its independence from, notably, the European Commission, if it is to
become a distinct and credible voice. Two other institutional innovations discussed are a move towards common
Eurozone representation in external fora, such as the International Monetary Fund, and a rather tentative ﬂoating of
the idea of a Eurozone Treasury. The latter is bound to be highly contentious, even though the Five Presidents
assert ﬁrmly that tax and spending decisions would continue to be taken at Member State level. A possible
implication of a new Treasury is the need to appoint a Eurozone Finance Minister, but that is not examined in the
report.
Over the last few years, the European Central Bank has greatly expanded its governance role, not only in the formal
powers associated with banking union, but also in, for example, being one of the three institutions in the Troika
overseeing countries subject to macroeconomic adjustment programmes. Some readers may, therefore, be
surprised that, although one of the Presidents is Mario Draghi, the report makes no direct proposals about the future
role of the ECB in economic governance. Some might say that is because the ECB has, on the whole, been decisive
and eﬀective so that it is best to leave well alone, but it is a dimension of completing EMU that others might think
warrants examination.
A key challenge in completing monetary union will be to obtain public support for what are often politically diﬃcult
measures. Proposals by the Five Presidents around legitimation and accountability are similar to those set out in
2012, referring to the role of national parliaments and the European Parliament. The lack of progress on this
component of a closer EMU is, itself, a source of dismay in several national capitals, although the Five Presidents
note that the right (already agreed) to call European Commissioners to appear before national parliaments ‘should
be exercised more systematically than at present’.
It is worth recalling that all these proposals will add to the array of governance changes already introduced since
2010. The ﬁscal compact, agreed despite David Cameron’s veto in 2011, and other reforms have established a
more rigorous system for monitoring and coordinating national ﬁscal policies, while complementary governance
innovations have been designed to curb damaging macroeconomic imbalances. The setting-up of the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) provided a permanent fund to be used to assist countries facing problems in funding
their borrowing, and there is more systematic annual monitoring of national economic policy through the ‘semester’
process. Many of these new arrangements were introduced outside the European treaties, for example through
separate treaties relating to the ﬁscal compact, bank resolution and the ESM. One other suggestion put forward by
the Five Presidents is to integrate some of these into the EU legal framework, something that could well be seen as
provocative in the UK if not handled with care.
For many national governments, the appetite for yet more change is limited, and this may make a number of them
reluctant to countenance further extensive reforms. Brussels insiders seem to be agreed, however, that this could be
the last chance to establish an enduring system for the governance of the euro. The Five Presidents are less
ambitious than the Four and this is probably a wise choice. But they will need to deliver and thereby break the
unfortunate propensity to announce wide-ranging initiatives at EU level, only for them subsequently to be watered-
down to the much more limited reforms able to command a consensus. Wish the Five Presidents luck; they will need
it.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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